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CRITICAL REALISM AND
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: 
COUNTER-INTUITIVE
ADVERSARIES OR 
OSTENSIBLE SOULMATES?
Abstract: Th e paper questions the
compatibility of critical realism with
ecological economics. In particular, it is
argued that there is radical dissonance
between ontological presuppositions
of ecological economics and critical 
realist perspective. Th e dissonance lies
in the need of ecological economics to
state strict causal regularities in socio-
economic realm, given the environ-
mental intuitions about the nature of 
economy and the role of materiality and 
non-human agency in persistence of 
economic systems. Using conceptual ap-
paratus derived from Andrew Brown’s
critique of critical realism and Bruno
Latour’s actor-network theory, the
paper refuses ontological nature/society 
dualism employed by critical realism,
and stresses the role of non-humans in
practical production and reproduction
of socio-economic networks on the one
hand, and in broadly defi ned ecological 
economic research on the other hand.
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Kritický realismus a ekologická 
ekonomie: neintuitivní protivníci 
nebo zřejmí spojenci?
Abstrakt: Příspěvek poukazuje
na  neslučitelnost ontologických 
předpokladů ekologické ekonomie 
s  teoretickým rámcem kritického 
realismu. Ekologická ekonomie totiž 
potřebuje předpokládat existenci 
kauzálních pravidelností ve  společ-
nosti a ekonomice, nakolik musí zů-
stávat věrná svým před-teoretickým 
intuicím o povaze ekonomiky, rovněž 
jako o  roli materiality i  ne-lidských 
aktérů pro existenci ekonomických 
systémů. V článku se pracuje s kon-
ceptuálním aparátem oponenta kri-
tického realismu Andrewa Browna 
a s teorií aktérů-sítí Bruna Latoura. 
Na tomto základě pak článek odmítá 
ontologický dualismus přírody a kul-
tury. Závěrem pak článek upozorňuje 
na  dvojitou roli ne-lidských aktérů 
v praktické produkci/reprodukci spo-
lečensko-ekonomických sítí a v široce 
pojatém ekologicky ekonomickém 
výzkumu.
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1. Introduction
Tony Lawson is widely acknowledged as one of the major contemporary 
philosophers of economics. He follows the school of critical realism set up 
by Roy Bhaskar’s theory of transcendental realism,1 and applies Bhaskar’s
general philosophy of science and social ontology in economic philosophy. 
In last decade, critical realism in Lawson’s interpretation emerged as an 
attempt to unify various heterodox economic schools. Lawson states that 
in social world, strict causal regularities of the form “When X then Y” are 
extremely rare.2 Th at means it provides alternative ontology to mainstream 
economics, where strict causal regularities are presupposed. However, it 
remains open how this philosophical school should be adopted by ecological 
economics. Th e argument presented here supports the assumption that if 
ecological economics were really to embrace the critical realism as its own 
paradigmatic theory, it would be in confl ict with central pre-analytic vi-
sion of ecological economics, as formulated e.g. by Clive Spash: economy is 
an inseparable part of the ecosystem in which it is situated.3 Such a vision 
has certain ontological consequences that confl ict with Lawson’s account 
of social reality and social agency. In particular, ecological economics 
implicitly supports an ontological account in which society and nature are 
not in hierarchical relation, but are parts of the same ontological region. It 
implies also that the boundaries between nature and society collapse and 
such a dualist framework then appears as inadequate ontological model. In 
essence, the blurring of nature/culture dichotomy is a central idea this paper 
follows.
At least two general motivations regarding discussion about compat-
ibility of critical realism and ecological economics can be found:
1  Roy BHASKAR, A Realist Th eory of Science. London – New York: Routledge 2008.
2  Clemens HIRSCH – C. Tyler DESROSCHES, “Cambridge Social Ontology: An Interview 
with Tony Lawson.” Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, vol. 2, 2009, no. 1,
pp. 113–114 (100–122).
3  Clive L. SPASH, “New Foundations for Ecological Economics.” Ecological Economics, vol. 77, 
2012, pp. 44–45 (36–47).
Th is paper was created in collaboration with Department of Environmental Studies, Faculty 
of Social Sciences, Masaryk University. Supported from the project MUNI/A/1004/2015 
“Contemporary approaches to the study of environmental phenomena II – Specifi c research 
at Masaryk University”.
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1. Tony Lawson proposes critical realism as a  unifying philosophical 
paradigm for heterodox economics.4 Besides post-Keynesian, feminist
or Marxist economics, the contemporary ecological economics can be 
equally included under this umbrella term. Critical realism is meant to 
provide solid ontological and methodological groundings for all these 
various economic studies. Th at could prove useful, since nowadays 
schools of ecological economics seem to rest in unstructured methodo-
logical pluralism, eclectics and overproduction of puzzling and contra-
dictory presuppositions.5
2. Critical realism has already been a  trending topic in ecological eco-
nomics, and in some sciences, such as critical management studies or 
human geography, it has recently emerged as one of the paradigmatic 
theories.6 Hence the critical discussion should add some limits to what 
extent the critical realism is applicable for ecological economics.
Given the pre-analytic vision of ecological economics, we need to pre-
sume that strict causal regularities are not rare in the socio-economic realm. 
For example, the following statement proposes strict regularity: “Intensi-
fi cation of industrial production in China leads to rising levels of CO2 in 
atmosphere.” Another example is: “An economy cannot grow indefi nitely 
in a fi nite world,” i.e. more growth implies more ecological turbulences. In 
uttering such statements, one posits some regularly occurring causal rela-
tion between economic activity and natural processes. Th ese statements are 
analysed as examples of collective events defi ned by Andrew Brown.7 Such
statements are standard for practically all branches of environmental sci-
ence and if it were true that they cannot be proposed, a huge part of eco-
logical research would be cast out as irrelevant. Th us, regarding ecological 
economics, we need to presuppose the existence of strict causal regularities 
in socio-economic realm, contrary to what Lawson proposes.
Moreover, the paper goes one step further even from Brown’s analysis. 
An alternative notion of social actor is introduced, because in critical real-
ism, this notion is too narrow to include some key economic actors – notably 
4 Tony LAWSON, “Th e Nature of Heterodox Economics.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
vol. 30, 2006, no. 4, p. 484 (483–505).
5 SPASH, “New Foundations for Ecological Economics,” p. 40.
6 HIRSCH – DESROSCHES, “Cambridge Social Ontology,” p. 103.
7 Andrew BROWN, “Reorienting Critical Realism: A  System-Wide Perspective on the 
Capitalist Economy.” Journal of Economic Methodology, vol. 14, 2007, no. 4, pp. 499–519.
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the non-human parts of the environment in which the economy is situated. 
To address this issue, Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT) is used.8
In terms of ANT, the nature of socio-economic reality is reconsidered and 
the question of elementary parts of social assemblage is newly answered
Here is an itinerary of the paper. In Section 2, the kernel of ecological 
economics is briefl y sketched. Section 3 describes critical realism’s social 
ontology and Lawson’s critique of economic mainstream, connected to 
an argument against the existence of strict regularities in socio-economic 
realm. Th e following Section 4 presents Andrew Brown’s notion of collective 
events, which opens up the possibility to propose strict causal regularities 
in economics anew. Further discussion of Lawson’s as well as Brown’s own 
ontology takes place in Section 5, where the perspective of ANT is intro-
duced. Concluding Section 6 points at the modernist notion of science and 
the blurring boundaries between nature and culture.
2. Ecological Economics
As probably in all recently emerged disciplines, the standard defi nition of 
what is ecological economics is not yet established. However, we can trace 
several core features that distinguish this fi eld of study as a separate scien-
tifi c discipline. Following some key authors – such as Herman Daly, Robert 
Constanza, Kenneth Boulding, Clive Spash, Inge Røpke or Silvio Funtowicz 
– the mostly agreed characteristics of ecological economics are:
1. Insistence on ethical dimension of economic practices.9
2. Intertwining natural and social sciences in order to describe the interconne-
ctions between human actions and ecosystem mechanisms.10
8  See Bruno LATOUR, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Th eory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005; Bruno LATOUR, We Have Never Been Modern. 
Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press 1993.
9 Clemens L. SPASH, “Th e Development of Environmental Th inking in Economics.” 
Environmental Values, vol. 8, 1999, no. 4, p.  413 (413–435); SPASH, “New Foundations for
Ecological Economics,” p. 45; Silvio O. FUNTOWICZ, S. – Jerome R. RAVETZ, “Th e Worth 
of a Songbird: Ecological Economics as a Post-Normal Science.” Ecological Economics, vol. 10, 
1993, no. 3, p. 205 (197–207).
10  SPASH, “Th e Development of Environmental Th inking in Economics,” p. 424; Inge ROPKE, 
“Th e Early History of Modern Ecological Economics.” Ecological Economics, vol. 50, 2004,
no. 3–4, p. 294 (293–314).
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3. Inspiration as well as critical distance from other heterodox traditions in
economics, such as institutional, Marxist or feminist economics.11
4. Strong orientation on policy-making, which is a consequence of conscious
normative groundings of ecological economics.12
5. Irreducible value pluralism, that is essential in grasping the problems of 
democratic negotiation of environmental policies.13
Th ese characteristics draw from the general intuition of ecological econo-
mics, as formulated by Inge Røpke:
Th e basic observation in ecological economics is banal and diffi  cult to disagree 
with: the human economy is embedded in nature, and economic processes are 
also always natural processes in the sense that they can be seen as biological, 
physical and chemical processes and transformations [...] Th e basic idea of what 
becomes ecological economics is that the economy ought to be studied also, but 
not only, as a natural object, and that economic processes should consequently 
also be conceptualized in terms usually used to describe processes in nature.14
Spash and Johanisová coined this proposition (italics in quotation above) 
as a pre-analytic vision of ecological economics.15 It can be also articulated 
as follows: economy is an inseparable part of the ecosystem in which it is 
situated.16
At this point, one shall argue that the same can be attributed to environ-
mental economics, understood as an attempt to extend the narrow-minded 
interpretation of what enters into mainstream economic analysis with 
environmental factors (both in terms of preconditions and consequences 
of economic activity), usually counted as mere externalities. Th e diff erence 
between ecological and environmental economics is however methodologi-
cally as well as ontologically insurmountable, for environmental economics 
does not take economic activity as genuinely biophysical. Moreover, it only 
“internalizes externalities”, i.e. evaluates ecosystems and their services in 
11  SPASH, “Th e Development of Environmental Th inking in Economics,” p. 413.
12 Ibid., p. 425; SPASH, “New Foundations for Ecological Economics,” p. 45; FUNTOWICZ –
RAVETZ, “Th e Worth of a Songbird,” p. 206.
13  SPASH, “Th e Development of Environmental Th inking in Economics,” p. 425; ROPKE, “Th e 
Early History of Modern Ecological Economics,” p. 294.
14  ROPKE, “Th e Early History of Modern Ecological Economics,” p. 294.
15  SPASH, “New Foundations for Ecological Economics,” pp. 36–47; Naďa JOHANISOVÁ, 
Ekologická ekonomie: vybrané kapitoly. Brno: Masarykova univerzita 2014.
16  SPASH, “New Foundations for Ecological Economics,” pp. 44–45.
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terms of mainstream economic methodology. For this reason, environmen-
tal economics is completely out of scope of this paper.
Let me explain now a  case of typical analytic apparatus of ecological 
economics. We can start from the Georgescu-Roegen distinction between 
three elements of economy: stocks, funds and fl ows. Imagine the economy 
as a giant organism that has certain inputs and certain outputs.17 In such 
a  system, materials and energy fl ow through it. Th e inputs can be sorted 
into two categories. An input of the fi rst type is a fund. Th e most common
fund is solar energy, which is always used only at the particular rate (i.e. it is 
not a subject of depletion) and as such it cannot be stockpiled without being 
captured in some specifi c energy carrier. Th e second type is a stock, which
means (besides other characteristics) that it can be stockpiled and once 
entering the system, it is a  subject of various transformations and can be 
depleted (the rate of extraction is not limited by the nature of the resource).
Stocks are basically the sources of energy carriers, such as oil, gas or coal. 
Given these defi nitions, a fl ow can be understood as a stream of energy car-
riers through the system.18
How is the economy conceived in this approach? In case of global terres-
trial ecosystem, the primary fund is solar energy.19 Th is energy is consumed 
by various strategies, e.g. photosynthesis. In limiting cases, it can be trapped 
for some time. Th at is the case of fossil fuels, which are virtually the rays of 
sun caught in the organic material that was accumulated under the surface 
17  It is important to note that the metaphor of organism is widely used across various social sci-
entifi c disciplines. In general, the use of metaphor in scientifi c explanation is usually ignored 
or belittled, but its omnipresence is nevertheless self-evident, from sociology or economics to 
political science and philosophy. See Zuzana KOBÍKOVÁ – Jakub MÁCHA, “From Metaphor 
to Hypertext: An Interplay of Organic and Mechanical Metaphorics in the Context of New 
Media Discovering.” 8th AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy: 20–22.4.2015; 
Th omas S. KUHN, “Metaphor in Science.” In: ORTONY, A. (ed.), Metaphor and Th ought. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979, pp. 409–419.
18  According to Herman E. DALY – Joshua FARLEY, Ecological Economics. Principles and 
Applications. Washington: Island Press 2011, pp. 70–72. See also Arnim SCHEIDEL – Alevgul 
H. SORMAN, “Energy Transitions and the Global Land Rush: Ultimate Drivers and Persistent 
Consequences.” Global Environmental Change, vol. 22, 2012, no. 3, pp. 589–590 (588–595).
19  Nicholas GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, “Energy and Economic Myths.” Southern Economic 
Journal, vol. 41, 1975, no. 3, p. 369 (347–381); see also Kenneth E. BOULDING, “Th e Economics 
of the Coming Spaceship Earth.” In: JARRETT, H. (ed.), Environmental Quality in a Growing 
Economy: Essays from the Sixth RFF Forum. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 1966, 
p. 5 (3–14).
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for hundreds of millions of years.20 Th e procreation of fossil fuel stands as an
example of the situation when a stock is created. It carries initial solar energy 
that can be unleashed by series of activities, such extraction, refi ning and 
combustion in our case of oil. Moreover, it can be materially transformed 
(e.g. oil can be converted into numerous types of plastics).
From this point of view, economy does not resemble a closed cycle of 
money and commodities between supply and demand. Instead, a picture of 
organic metabolism arises. It is particularly important to stress that ecologi-
cal economics introduces biophysical processes as central to the existence 
of economy. We end up with a picture of economics as analysis of material 
and energy fl ows through the system, because as the matter of fact, economy 
is a system of material processes and it ought to be studied in this respect.21
Henceforward, ecological economics balances between natural and 
social scientifi c approach. It frequently crosses the borders between realms 
of physical reality and social constructions, in order to include all objects 
that count in real-world economy for the purpose of adequate explanation its 
structuration and dynamics. It follows that sometimes, ecological econom-
ics states propositions claiming strict causal regularities of the form “If A, 
then B always follows,” as in the case of the platitude that we cannot grow in-
defi nitely in a fi nite world.22 Such a general assertion is a hidden declaration 
of causal relation between growth of economy and the stability/resilience of 
global ecosystem – the more growth you have, so worse for the ecosystem. 
Taking ecosystem stability and resilience as central abilities for its defence 
against disrupting exogenous factors, growth of economy increases stability 
but lowers the resilience of the system, i.e. it leaves the system vulnerable to 
exogenous factors and also uncovers structural problems that are in many 
cases just accidents waiting to happen.23 Growth of economy as an impera-
tive of capitalism is intrinsically connected with existence of cheap and ac-
cessible energy resources.24 Th at brings us back to fossil fuels. Evidence from 
energy studies, namely in research on Peak-Oil, suggests another causal 
20 Christian KERSCHNER, “Economic De-Growth vs. Steady-State Economy.” Journal of 
Cleaner Production, vol. 18, 2010, no. 6, p. 546 (544–551).
21  GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, “Energy and Economic Myths,” p. 350.
22  See e. g. BOULDING, “Th e Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth,” pp. 3–14.
23  Crawford S. HOLLING, “Th e Resilience of Terrestrial Ecosystems: Local Surprise and 
Global Change.” In: CLARK, W. C. – MUNN, R. E. (eds.), Sustainable Development of the
Biosphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986, pp. 296–297, 308, 311 (292–317).
24  Charles A. S. HALL – David J. MURPHY, “Energy Return on Investment, Peak Oil, and the 
End of Economic Growth.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, no. 1219, 2011, p. 52
(52–72).
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regularity within current economic system – the predominant depletion of 
fossil fuels that is a necessary precondition to maintain capitalism.25 Th ese 
examples will be further investigated in Section 4.
3. Critical Realism
Generally speaking, critical realism can be introduced as a version of social 
ontology. By social ontology, it is meant here philosophical endeavour cha-
llenging the questions of basic existences that are units of social analysis. 
For example, when economist formulates theory of economic behaviour, 
she presupposes certain agents (e.g. fi rm) with certain properties (e.g. or-
ganisational structure, sets of preferences) and other entities that interfere 
with these agents (e.g. commodities, money). Moreover, critical realism is 
a  realist ontology, i.e. it poses an existence of external reality behind the 
perceiving subject – there is simply some “world out there”, independent on 
the perception.26 Crucially, critical realism states that social reality is funda-
mentally diff erent from natural reality, thus we can distinguish between two 
ontological “layers” that enjoy certain level of mutual autonomy.27 Th e exact 
relation between those layers is the one of emergence: properties of entities
situated in “higher” level are dependant but not reducible to properties in 
“lower” layer.28 For example, economic actors exist only insofar there are
atoms and molecules in the universe, but it is nonsensical to reduce those 
actors to sole atoms and molecules and explain their economic behaviour 
in terms of particle physics. Similarly, according to critical realism, social 
institutions exist insofar as there are conscious human beings, but these 
institutions are more than simple conglomerates or concatenations of in-
dividuals – they are emergent structures irreducible to individuals. Th us 
social and natural layers are ontologically dissociated. Nature is the realm
25  KERSCHNER, C. et al., “Economic Vulnerability to Peak Oil.” Global Environmental Change, 
vol. 23, 2013, no. 6, pp. 1424–1425 (1424–1433); KERSCHNER, C., “Peak-Oil.” In: D’ALISA, 
G. – DEMARIA, F. – KALLIS, G. (eds.), Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Paradigm. London: 
Routledge 2015, p. 131 (129–132); Andreas MALM, Fossil Capital. London: Verso 2016.
26  Margaret ARCHER, “Introduction: Realism in the Social Sciences.” In: ARCHER M. et al. 
(eds.), Critical Realism: Essential Readings. London – New York: Routledge 1998, pp. 194–195 
(189–205).
27 ARCHER, “Introduction: Realism in the Social Sciences,” p.  189. For stratifi cation, see
also Roy BHASKAR – Tony LAWSON, “Introduction: Basic Texts and Developments.” In: 
ARCHER et al. (eds.), Critical Realism, p. 6 (3–15).
28  BHASKAR, A Realist Th eory of Science, pp. 102–103.
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of iron causal rules; society functions in terms of ever-changing dialectical 
dynamics.29
Critical realism further employs these assumptions to tackle methodol-
ogy of mainstream economics.30 Notably, critical realism insists that despite
mathematic analysis proved to be fruitful methodology in physics (situated 
in layer 1), it is not decisive reason for its application in sociology or econom-
ics (situated in layer 2).31 Social reality has to be treated as dynamic, proces-
sual, continually reproduced and transformed by social practice, structured,
meaningful, valuable, relational and morphogenetic.32 It follows that “[...]
social reality is found not to comprise parts that are isolated, for more or 
less everything seems to be constituted in relation to other things. And com-
ponents cannot be treated as atomistic or stable, for each is being continually 
transformed.“33 Th is conclusion is supported by our a posteriori observation 
of recurring failures to predict economic events by mainstream economics, 
or by dissonances between electoral polls and real results. Consequently, 
social reality is in critical realism evidently open and unpredictable. Hence 
one shall pay good attention to the methods that one uses in approaching 
social reality. Let me closely explain these statements.
Critical realism obviously stands in sharp contrast with underlying 
ontological and consequently methodological presuppositions of main-
stream economics. In particular, critical realism proposes social ontology 
that leaves the methodology of mainstream economics inadequate. Th e 
latter studies socio-economic layer by means of formal-deductive method 
that according to critical realism does not meet the essential ontological 
features of this layer. Th us Lawson criticizes mainstream economics for be-
ing ultimately exclusive in relation to any other method than quantitative, 
formal-deductive method of econometrics. He traces this insistence back to 
the three interconnected propositions mainstream economics rests upon:
29 ARCHER, “Introduction: Realism in the Social Sciences,” p. 195.
30  According to Lawson, the defi nition of mainstream economics can be stated in following 
terms: “the mainstream project of modern economics just is an insistence, as a discipline-wide 
principle, that economic phenomena be investigated using only certain mathematical–deduc-
tive forms of reasoning.” LAWSON “Th e Nature of Heterodox Economics,” p. 492. See also 
Tony LAWSON, “Economic Science Without Experimentation / Abstraction.” In: ARCHER et 
al. (eds.), Critical Realism: Essential Readings, pp. 144–186.
31 LAWSON “Economic Science Without Experimentation / Abstraction,” p. 163, 169.
32  LAWSON, “Th e Nature of Heterodox Economics,” pp. 495–496; see also Tony LAWSON, 
Reorienting Economics. London – New York: Routledge 2003, pp. 16–17.
33 HIRSCH – DESROSCHES, “Cambridge Social Ontology,” p. 114.
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1. Event regularities:34 Formal-deductive models presuppose the existence 
of strict causal regularities in social world of the form “If A, then B 
always follows,”35 e.g. “Increase in oil prices (A) causes infl ation (B).”
Th e presence of event regularities in a system means that given system is 
intrinsically closed.36
2. Isolated atoms: Th e causal explanations of economic phenomena can be
formulated in terms of “isolated atoms”.37 Th ese isolated events or ob-
jects can be represented as factors that are elements of the causal nexus.38
In oil price-infl ation nexus, increase in oil prices is such an isolated, 
atomic factor.
3. System isolation (separability): Th e system which displays causal regula-
rities is separated from external infl uences, i.e. it is extrinsically closed.39
Lawson states this condition in following terms: “[...] if the factor is 
triggered–this triggering is the fi rst event–the same outcome, the second 
event, always follows, so long as nothing interferes. It is the assumption
of system isolation that guarantees that nothing does interfere.”40 In case
of oil price caused infl ation, it means that if no third distinct element 
occurs (e.g. sudden shift  in demand), the causal relation always holds.
Any system that displays causal regularities must fulfi l these three premises 
and is labelled as closed system in terminology of critical realism. While
closed system is defi ned in terms of extrinsic and intrinsic closure [premises 
1) and 3)], critical realism also distinguishes open systems, where multiple 
causal mechanisms operate simultaneously and thus it is impossible to 
determine single causal factor that repeatedly triggers the same outcome.41
Neither intrinsic, nor extrinsic closure takes place in a system of this kind.
According to critical realism, socio-economic realm is precisely the paradig-
matic case of an open system (because of its relational and dynamic features) 
34 “Event regularities” and “(strict) causal regularities” are used interchangeably.
35  HIRSCH – DESROSCHES, “Cambridge Social Ontology,” p. 113. See also BHASKAR, R. – 
LAWSON, T., “Introduction: Basic Texts and Developments,” pp. 14–15.
36 ARCHER, “Introduction: Realism in the Social Sciences,” p. 190.
37  LAWSON, Reorienting Economics, p. 225.
38 HIRSCH – DESROSCHES, “Cambridge Social Ontology,” p. 113.
39  LAWSON, Reorienting Economics, p. 224; ARCHER, “Introduction: Realism in the Social 
Sciences,” p. 190.
40  HIRSCH – DESROSCHES, “Cambridge Social Ontology,” p. 113.
41  Ted BENTON, “Realism and Social Science. Some Comments on Roy Bhaskar’s ‘Th e 
Possibility of Naturalism’.” In: ARCHER et al. (eds.), Critical Realism: Essential Readings, 
p. 300, 308 (297–312).
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and it follows that genuine strict regularities – similar to the iron causal 
rules of nature – do not occur here.42
Econometrics is thus ontologically inadequate method for economic 
science, since socio-economic systems are not closed, granted the features 
of social reality enlisted above, such as relationality.43 Against premise 2), 
relationality alone contradicts any possibility of atomization of social sys-
tem.44 Furthermore, meaningfulness of social realm implies discrepancy 
with premise 3), since social systems are always open to new articulation and 
re-interpretation, which leads to impossibility of any systematic isolation.45
Imposing formal-deductive quantitative methods on society or economy 
violates their structuration and dynamics, and the models these methods 
yield are inherently biased in this respect.
4. Collective events
Let us problematize assumptions of critical realism. What’s the drawback of 
exorcizing strict regularities from social reality, as critical realism attempts 
for? In general, the problem is that social realm sticks together by practices 
of social actors. It is not an abstract structure imposed on material world – 
social structure is continuously produced, shaped and re-shaped in practices 
situated in the material world. Indeed, it is trivial to assert that social norms 
are parts of social system. However, these norms exist only in practice and 
so the system as such persists as long as certain rules are being recurrently 
obeyed. A  recurrence of certain practice in predominant population of 
social actors is thus a  necessary condition for persistence of given socio-
-economic system, or – as Andrew Brown would say – an organic necessity
of the system.46 To grasp the socio-economic network adequately, we have 
to give an account of key causal regularities that are reproduced in the 
system.
What are the features of these key regularities? Brown labels them as 
collective events. By using this notion, he tries to show that “the contempo-
rary economic system displays many strict event regularities, and is in this
42 ARCHER, “Introduction: Realism in the Social Sciences,” p. 190.
43  Roy BHASKAR, “Societies.” In: ARCHER et al. (eds.), Critical Realism: Essential Readings, 
p. 225 (206–257).
44  HIRSCH – DESROSCHES, “Cambridge Social Ontology,” p. 114.
45  ARCHER, “Introduction: Realism in the Social Sciences,” p. 189.
46  BROWN, “Reorienting Critical Realism,” p. 510.
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sense ‘closed’ contra critical realism.”47 Th e defi nition of collective event is 
the following one:
When taking a system-wide, historical perspective on capitalism, an [collective] 
“event” is defi ned over a collection of individuals across the capitalist system 
[...] as follows: “many individuals go to work for a wage”, “many capitalist fi rms 
produce in order to make profi t”, “there is ubiquitous buying and selling of 
commodities” [...] Collectively defi ned events characteristic of capitalism (hen-
ceforth termed “collective events”), so formulated, could also be termed “states 
of aff airs”.48
It is important to stress that collective events are detectable only at system-
-wide perspective. Brown acknowledges that from an individual perspective, 
critical realism appears to be correct, because an individual cannot grasp 
the system at large – in his or her immediate context, reality can seem to be 
pretty irregular.49 But once we abandon an individual perspective, collective
events are traceable in given social system. What are the characteristic fea-
tures of such events? Here we can list these four:
1. Collective events are empirically unobservable, i.e. we never see many indi-
viduals going to work, but always only some small subset of individuals at given 
spatiotemporal coordinates.
2. Th ey typically appear during a longer period of time.
3. An utterance of collective event is indicated by operators as “many”, 
“large”, “predominant”, etc.
4. Th e persistence of given socio-economic system presupposes an occurrence 
of collective events.50
For example, to make the capitalist system viable, the permanent transac-
tion of money for commodities and back to more money at certain level 
has to occur.51 Another case is the depletion of cheap and accessible energy 
resources mentioned in Section 2. Certain practices need to be conducted in 
suffi  ciently large amount in order to preserve the system. Th us to state that 
47 Ibid., p. 501.
48 Ibid., p. 508.
49 Ibid.
50  According to BROWN, “Reorienting Critical Realism,” pp. 508–509.
51  M-C-M’ formula, see Karl MARX, Capital. Volume 1. London: Penguin Books 1976, 
pp. 250–251.
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we live in capitalism means to bind oneself to some ontological assumptions 
– namely that there are regularly occurring events. It means that we propose 
a  self-reproducing mechanism, verbalized as an assertion of strict causal
regularity of the form “When X then Y”, or to be more concrete, of the form 
“When C(t) then C(t+1)”, where C is a collective event and t is a period when
C occurs.52 Th at is exactly the case of fossil fuel extraction in capitalism53 – to 
maintain the growth-based extractive capitalism, and thus also to maintain 
an extraction of fossil fuels at t+1, the predominant extraction of fossil fuels
at t must be the case. To extract an energy resource, you need some energy – 
and that energy can be gained only by extraction of a resource in a preceding 
period of time.54
Collective events are precisely what is grasped in analysis of ecological 
economics. Claiming for example that an economic growth is associated 
with the relative growth in extraction of main energy resources55 is not to 
assert mere correlation, but a concatenation of collective events explicable as
causal regularity. Blurring the boundaries between natural and social sci-
ences in study of socio-economic system, manifested also in pre-analytic 
vision of ecological economics, enables to formulate strict event regularities, 
because an ontological realm of social reality is inseparable from nature.56
Th is inseparability of social and natural can be clearly seen in ecological 
economic analysis, where socio-economic system is driven by forces of ther-
modynamics and is bounded by principal mechanisms of global ecosystem.
To sum up this section, in ecological economics, economy is not only 
embedded in, interfering with or connected to ecosystem, it is an intrin-
sic part of the ecosystem itself. As far as the ecosystem is assembled from 
natural, biophysical objects, it follows that economic relations and activities 
are also biophysical. And by biophysical it is meant displaying certain strict 
event regularities understood as collective events. Th us, to conduct ecologi-
cal economic research means to formulate strict causal regularities, if one 
wishes to stay faithful to the pre-analytic vision of this discipline. Ecological 
economics thus confl icts with the ontology of critical realism.
52  BROWN, “Reorienting Critical Realism,” p. 510.
53 MALM, Fossil Capital.
54  KERSCHNER, “Peak-Oil,” p. 131.
55  HALL – MURPHY, “Energy Return on Investment,” p. 54; MALM, Fossil Capital.
56  Jason W. MOORE, Capitalism in the Web of Life. London: Verso 2015, p. 7.
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5. Materiality/Who acts?
Brown’s notion of collective events and his critique of critical realism is 
connected with the argument that we can’t abstract from reproductive so-
cial practice when we think about the persistence of given socio-economic 
system.57 As far as the notion of practice is essentially connected with our 
conception of social agency, this statement opens up two interdependent sets 
of questions:
1. Who are social actors? Is the scope of social agency restricted solely on 
human beings? Is there any room for non-human actors?
2. What is the role of materiality in persistence of social systems? Are ma-
terial objects mobilised in social relations to actively engage in persistence of 
given system?
By using Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT), my contention is that 
from the perspective of ecological economics, a) social (or economic) agency 
cannot be restricted on human beings, and b) material objects are actively 
engaged in persistence of given socio-economic system. Latour in general 
follows the line of Deleuzian assemblage theory.58 Assemblages emerge as
networked systems across various segments of heterogeneous actors. Such 
systems can be analysed simultaneously in their separate parts as well as in 
their irreducible properties emerging through complex interaction, because 
the Deleuzian of relations of exteriority59 hold here: “[...] the exteriority of 
relations implies a certain autonomy for the terms they relate, or as Deleuze 
puts it, it implies that ‘a relation may change without the terms changing’.”60
As a  consequence, the properties of the component parts “[...] can never 
explain the relations which constitute a whole.”61 Links between the parts 
are analytically and ontologically prior to the parts themselves.
Bruno Latour operationalizes assemblage theory in terms of actor-
networks and provides sound argumentation against predominant notion of 
social agency, which employs dualist framework of social structures emerg-
ing from interactions between human agents. Such an anthropocentric 
defi nition of social actor can be contested by the idea of materiality – “[...]
57 BROWN, “Reorienting Critical Realism,” pp. 512–513.
58 Gilles DELEUZE – Félix GUATTARI, A  Th ousand Plateaus. Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press 1987.
59 Ibid., p. 9.
60  Manuel DELANDA, A New Philosophy of Society. London: Continuum 2006, pp. 10–11.
61 Ibid., p. 11.
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the notion that social existence involves not only actors and social relations 
but also objects.”62 Th e very defi nition of actor in ANT springs out from the 
acceptance of materiality as inherent part of social. Actor (or actant)63 is “[...] 
any thing that does modify a state of aff airs by making a diff erence.”64 Why?
If action is limited a priori to what “intentional”, “meaningful” humans do, it is 
hard to see how a hammer, a basket, a door closer, a cat, a rug, a mug, a list, or 
a tag could act. Th ey might exist in the domain of “material” “causal” relations, 
but not in the “refl exive” “symbolic” domain of social relations.65
Material objects are thus genuine sources of persistence of social. No 
abstract, underlying social force is needed, because social is made up and 
sticks together by means of a-social: “[...] ‘social’ is not some glue that could 
fi x everything including what the other glues cannot fi x; it is what is glued 
together by many other types of connectors.”66 It follows that the elements 
which are glued together in socio-economic assemblages are predominantly 
material – from energy resources and power plants, through cars and hou-
ses to computers and plastic bottles. Th us socio-natural hybrids emerge.67
Moreover, society is repeatedly elaborated, assembled and re-assembled.68
In other words, non-human agencies have to be massively mobilised in 
order to maintain such a  large network, as in the case of global economy. 
Material and natural objects render their literally “steely qualities” to any 
social network.69
By means of illustration, consider a fl ight of an airplane. Who exactly 
drives the plane? A pilot – that would be a typical answer. But let me examine 
this case in detail. To make a fl ight happen, we surely need to invoke a large 
body of another actors – navigators, communication systems, airports, fos-
sil fuels, engineers etc. All these entities are in action while a  plane fl ies 
62 Trevor PINCH – Richard SWEDBERG, “Introduction.” In: PINCH, T. – SWEDBERG, R. 
(eds.), Living in a Material World. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press 2008, p. 1 (1–26).
63  ANT has borrowed the term “actant” from literal science, where agency is distributed to 
various exotic entities, e.g. dwarfs. See LATOUR, Reassembling the Social, pp. 54–55.
64 Ibid., p. 71.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., p. 5.
67 LATOUR, We Have Never Been Modern, pp. 10–11, 30–105.
68 LATOUR, Reassembling the Social, p. 47.
69 Ibid., p. 68.
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above our heads, they are simultaneously engaged in action – an agency is 
distributed between all of them.70 An action is overtaken:
[...] the very word actor directs our attention to a complete dislocation of the 
action, warning us that it is not a coherent, controlled, well-rounded, and clean-
-edged aff air. By defi nition, action is dislocated. Action is borrowed, distribu-
ted, suggested, infl uenced, dominated, betrayed, translated.71
Social sciences – including economics – then come to be studies of asso-
ciations; practices of tracing the connections. Here Brown’s observation of 
centrality of reproductive practices is acknowledged, however the scope of 
actors conducting these operations is largely extended due to insistence on 
centrality of materiality. Perhaps the materiality of social can be in fact best 
acknowledged in economic science – as theories from Aristotle and Xeno-
phon through Physiocrats to political economy of 19th century indeed show 
us.72 For example, Smith gives a very detailed account of wealth in Wealth
of Nations (1776) in terms of physical objects that constitute the wealth.73
He also emphasises that a real source of wealth is in labour, i.e. in physical 
practice conducted in a material world.74 Ecological economics just extended 
the realm of relevant material objects and processes that are genuine parts 
of economy to other natural objects and their assemblages, by introducing 
ecosystem as a framework in which economic metabolism is situated. Such 
an approach contrasts with environmental economics, which ignores the 
heterogeneity and materiality of actor-networks and extends the scope of 
economic analysis only in terms of compiling various types of agencies into 
homogeneous mainstream-economic ontological register.
Th is picture contrasts the social ontology of critical realism, where the 
agency is granted only to humans and social world is on an ontological level 
radically distinguished from nature.75 Exclusion of non-human agency is
70 Michel CALLON, “Economic Markets and the Rise of Interactive Agencements: From 
Prosthetic Agencies to Habilitated Agencies.” In: PINCH – SWEDBERG (eds.), Living in 
a Material World, pp. 34–36 (29–56).
71  LATOUR, Reassembling the Social, p. 46.
72  Richard SWEDBERG, “Th e Centrality of Materiality: Economic Th eorizing from Xenophon 
to Home Economics and Beyond.” In: PINCH – SWEDBERG (eds.), Living in a  Material 
World, pp. 60, 68–69 (57–87).
73 Ibid., p. 69.
74 Ibid., p. 70.
75  LAWSON, “Th e Nature of Heterodox Economics,” p. 495; Frederic LEE, “Critical Realism, 
Grounded Th eory, and Th eory Construction in Heterodox Economics.” MPRA, 2012, 
no. 40341, p. 10. Available at: <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40341/> [cit. 27. 10. 2016].
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however present also in Brown’s systematic dialectics.76 A socio-economic 
actor in critical realist’s social ontology is simply understood as human 
actor who possesses intentional attitudes.77 Social reality is thus at least 
partly dependant on human beings78 and they are the ultimate creators of 
social sphere, because human beings are possessed with capacity to always 
act otherwise than what is prescribed in established social order, which 
explains why social reality is an unpredictable open system.79 Th e agency 
of other entities is not discussed in critical realism – non-humans are just 
mere parts of surrounding context, in terminology of critical realism called 
structure.80 It is indeed quite an old-fashioned sociological account in which 
social is understood as a  distinct dimension, structure or order. Social is 
some special feature that makes an object an inhabitant of “social” world, 
it is a diff erentia specifi ca of an independent ontological level, that distin-
guishes it from another levels, such as geological, biological, chemical etc. It 
is a kind of a substance, a special stuff  81 – similar to Aristotelian ether, which 
guaranteed the revolution of celestial bodies around the Earth, granted its 
inherent ability of circular motion.
Such a  perspective is glossed by Latour as insuffi  cient: “Like humble 
servants, they [non-humans] live on the margins of the social doing most of 
the work but never allowed to be represented as such.”82 Let me pose a ques-
tion: Where exactly social practice (including science) happens? Surely in 
a material world and by means of material objects.83 Moreover, these objects
are not passive, they actively take part in social practice as actors. Why? Our 
life in a material world is negotiated not only between humans and collec-
76 BROWN, “Reorienting Critical Realism,” p. 504.
77  Th at does not necessarily mean social reality is made up of intentional states, as Archer 
points out. Nevertheless, consciousness (intentionality) still determines social agency in 
critical realism. See ARCHER, “Introduction: Realism in the Social Sciences,” pp. 189–205. 
Further see LAWSON, Reorienting Economics, p. 46.
78 LAWSON, Reorienting Economics, p. 16.
79  ARCHER, “Introduction: Realism in the Social Sciences,” pp. 189–190, 193.
80 Ibid., p. 191.
81  LATOUR, Reassembling the Social, p. 1.
82 Ibid., p. 73.
83  Zdeněk KONOPÁSEK, “Making Th inking Visible with Atlas.ti: Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Analysis as Textual Practices.” Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research, vol. 9, 2008, no. 2. Available at: <http://www.qualitative-research.
net/index.php/fqs/article/view/420/910> [cit. 14. 7. 2016]; LATOUR, We Have Never Been
Modern, p. 24; Bruno LATOUR, “How to be Iconophilic in Art, Science and Religion?” In: 
JONES, C. – GALISON, P. (eds.), Picturing Science, Producing Art. London: Routledge 1998, 
pp. 436–437 (418–440).
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tives of humans, but also between us and objects in nature. Th at is precisely 
the case of recent ecological catastrophes, such as Typhoon Haiyan or fi res 
in Canadian Alberta and Indonesia.84 Th e global ecosystem states through
events like these the conditions of existence of human society within large-
scale planetary structures. Th e question of our relation towards objects is 
thus not just a question for natural sciences – it is at the same time the social 
and political question. Non-humans are actively engaged in social and po-
litical processes.
To sum up, non-human actors are in critical realism a priori excluded, 
which violates Latourian social ontology. Such an exclusion is unjustifi ed, 
once we see how important non-human objects are in social order. It re-
sembles the cartographer that is trying to sketch a continent by means of 
easily grasped geometrical fi gures (rectangles, hexagons, lines ...), ignoring 
all the nuances of the seashores.85 In her eff ort, she tries to push reality to
fi t into preordained forms, and thus she violates the shape of an object he 
describes. To stay faithful to the reality, one needs – as our cartographer – to 
give up the well-defi ned concepts and ground them in the inconsistences of 
the world, populated by actors of many kinds. Th e fi nal justifi cation of our 
shift  towards broader notion of actor is then the following one:
[...] we are going to accept as full-blown actors entities that were explicitly 
excluded from collective existence by more than one hundred years of social ex-
planation. Th e reasons are twofold: fi rst, because the basic social skills provide 
only one tiny subset of the associations making up societies; second, because 
the supplement of force which seems to reside in the invocation of a social tie is, 
at best, a convenient shorthand and, at worst, nothing more than a tautology.86
Recall now the pre-analytic vision of ecological economics: “[...] the human
economy is embedded in nature, and economic processes are also always na-
84  For the case of Typhoon Hayian, see Damian CARRINGTON – Rowena MASON. Cameron 
Links Typhoon Haiyan to Climate Change [online]. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2013/nov/16/david-cameron-climate-change-typhoon-haiyan> [cit. 14. 7. 
2016]; Dana NUCCITELLI, Will Extreme Weather Like Super Typhoon Haiyan Become the 
New Norm? [online]. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-
consensus-97-per-cent/2013/nov/20/ climate-change-haiyan-hurricanes> [cit. 14. 7. 2016]; 
Jennifer A. FRANCIS – Stephen J. VAVRUS, “Evidence Linking Arctic Amplifi cation to 
Extreme Weather in Mid-Latitudes.” Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 39, 2012, no. 6; James
B. ELSNER et al., “Sensitivity of Limiting Hurricane Intensity to Ocean Warmth.” Geophysical 
Research Letters, vol. 39, 2012, no. 17.
85  LATOUR, Reassembling the Social, p. 23.
86 Ibid., p. 69.
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tural processes in the sense that they can be seen as biological, physical and 
chemical processes and transformations [...]”87 Th e abasement of economy 
to the level of natural processes is a complementary motion to upheaving 
material objects on the social level. Th ese two motions meet each other in 
a fi nal picture of one shared reality of heterogeneous entities – a sort of fl at 
ontology. Ecological economics thus contradicts hierarchical ontology of 
critical realism.
6. Conclusion: A non-modernist rationale
Once we know that social is not something only loosely connected to the 
nature, a  new meaning is rendered to this word. By social (in an old-fa-
shion modernistic sense), we should mean from now only a small portion 
of entities and relations that are genuinely intertwined in actor-network, 
in a collective. Th e old term of social only “off ers convenient shorthand to 
designate all the ingredients already accepted in the collective realm.”88 But
the totality of assemblage of social is signifi cantly larger, as the last chapter 
intended to show. Nature and society are in this sense inadequate modernist 
categories that collapse into each other. Latour shows how the modern con-
stitution – the ontological model of modernist project – was settled up by the 
practice of purifi cation, an intellectual work of separating human activity 
from non-human world.89 Work of purifi cation (as manifested for example 
in Cartesian dualism) sorts out objects and subjects and allocates them to 
the reigns where they “naturally” belong; it makes reality well-defi ned and 
comprehensible. On the other hand, the precondition of existence of modern 
society is a simultaneous work of translation (or mediation), that blends na-
tural and human bodies and creates hybrid networks, in which things are 
mobilized in order to petrify and extend social network.
Here one can fi nd the asymmetry of modernism. Nature inevitably 
invades into pure social structure, but the clear cut between natural and cul-
tural pertains. To regain a symmetrical position, we need to do an anthropo-
logical turn – to direct the instruments of ethnography at our own modern 
world, to decolonize the West from its own prejudice of modernism; the 
prejudice of a Great Divide between Us and Th em.90 Indeed, last decades of 
87 ROPKE, “Th e Early History of Modern Ecological Economics,” p. 294.
88  LATOUR, Reassembling the Social, p. 11.
89 LATOUR, We Have Never Been Modern, pp. 10–11, 30–31.
90 Ibid., p. 97.
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ethnographic research have turned its attention towards the modern world 
and helped to clarify that in fact, we are the same as pre-moderns, showing
that no Great Division has ever been suffi  ciently established in terms of real 
historical actor-networks.91 Th e only diff erence between moderns and pre-
moderns is in the scope of mobilization of non-humans and in a  level of 
proliferation of hybrid socio-natural networks.92 Th e boundaries between 
modern and pre-modern constitution, and consequently between nature 
and culture, are not a matter of ontological diff erence, but just a question of 
scale; needless to say that these dual categories serve as the cornerstone of 
modernist epistemological outlook, with all the colonial implications.
If we have never been modern, our science has also never been mod-
ern. An idea of modern science is closely tied to Kuhn’s conception of 
normal science.93 It depicts science as a  rigorous activity conducted in 
a well-established, consistent framework. In a period of normal science (in
contrast to the situation of scientifi c revolution), fundamental propositions
of given paradigmatic theory are not contested and innovations are strictly 
controlled. Disciplinary boundaries are also narrowly defi ned and research
problems/areas overlap only exceptionally.94 Normal science resembles an 
activity of puzzle-solving, as if every piece of scientifi c knowledge were on 
a  table, as if the task of science were merely to rearrange the pieces in an
adequate manner.95
Critical realism accepts the framework of modern, normal science, 
for its ontology accepts nature/culture dichotomy, where problems and
objects are clearly sorted out. From this point of view, it is incompatible 
with ecological economics, which has intuitively closer to fl at ontology of 
actor-networks. But here the conundrums of critical realism do not end. Th e
argument against strict causal regularities is in fact within the modernist
mainstream economic paradigm, for it adheres to the methodological obses-
sion with regularities. Th e resistance against and insistence on existence of 
strict causal regularities in social reality are complementary. One should not
only get rid of an obsession with formal-deductive method, but of the very 
91  Just to mention the brilliant volume APPADURAI, A. (ed.), Th e Social Life of Th ings: 
Commodities in Cultural Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986.
92  LATOUR, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 105.
93  Th omas S. KUHN, Th e Structure of Scientifi c Revolution. 3rd Edition. Chicago – London:
University of Chicago Press 1996.
94  KUHN, Th e Structure of Scientifi c Revolution, pp. 6–7, 23–24.
95  Roger, STRAND, “Postnormal Science.” In: GUSTON, D. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Nanoscience
and Society. Th ousand Oaks (CA): SAGE Publications 2010, p. 623 (622–624).
Lukáš Likavčan
469
notion of scientifi c fact based exclusively on identifying recurrent casual 
events in reality. Th ere are numerous mechanisms generating scientifi c facts 
(granted there are many types of associations) and our task is not to exclude 
any of these mechanisms from any fi eld of research. It means – besides other 
things – that strict causal regularities can be found also in social reality, as 
well as other procedures generating scientifi c facts.
Historically speaking, society was understood as a  realm of contin-
gency, while nature as a domain of iron causal rules. Now, we ended up with 
only one level of reality, which is a realm of contingency and regularity at 
the same time. Th ere is nothing inherently contradictory in asserting that 
in contingent world, regularities can occur, because the stability of rules 
governing reality can very well be the case in contingent universe if we as-
sume that the set of possible worlds is transfi nite.96 So yes, it is true that
surprises happen and some events are spontaneous. But it is important to 
point out that surprises occur in both what could be coined as social and as 
natural reality in the old modernist constitution of the world. Blurring the 
boundaries between nature and culture does not rule out the existence of 
strict regularities. One and the same assemblage of heterogeneous actors can 
display causal regularities in one respect and unpredictable events in other. 
Th is idea is in fact close to recent elaborations in speculative realism/object-
oriented ontology,97 and it points out that the notion of causality should be
generally much more nuanced than is the case in critical discussion between 
critical realism and mainstream economics. However, precisely for the sake 
of the argumentation clarity, I have deliberately restricted my considerations 
to strict causal regularities, i.e. monocausal relations.
From aforementioned remarks on causality it seems necessary to look 
up for another vision of science, one that resembles more an unending 
fl uid practice than a  solid framework. Such is the concept of post-normal 
science, where scientifi c work is a  process of continual arrangement and 
re-arrangement of entities, as any other social (hence material) practice. In 
this process, we cope with problems involving irreducible complexities and 
uncertainties, such as the case of global climate change or biosafety issues.98
96  Quentin MEILLASSOUX, Aft er Finitude. London: Continuum 2008, pp. 101–104.
97 See Graham HARMAN, Quadruple Object. Winchester – Washington: Zero Books 2011,
p.  118; Timothy MORTON, Hyperobjects. London – Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press 2013, pp. 39–41.
98 Silvio O. FUNTOWICZ – Roger STRAND, “Models of Science and Policy.” In: TRAAVIK, 
T. – LIM, L. C. (eds.), Biosafety First: Holistic Approaches to Risk and Uncertainty in Genetic 
Engineering and Genetically Modifi ed Organisms. Trondheim: Tapir 2007, p. 265 (263–278).
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Th ese problems can be labelled as post-normal problems. At the same time, 
they are non-modern problems in the sense that they can’t be grasped in 
the modernist scientifi c framework. Th e reason is that these problems are 
complex, i.e. they can be described using multiple and mutually irreducible 
narrative registers.99
But when one talks about uncertainty in complex issues, one does not 
assert a global uncertainty, a total arbitrariness and unpredictability of be-
haviour of the system under scrutiny. Uncertainties arise also in systems 
whose general mechanisms can be described in terms of strict regularities, 
as in the case of climate change. We know pretty well how the climate be-
haves and what are some key factors infl uencing this behaviour. But still, 
we are at odds once we are trying to fully describe dynamics of climate and 
predict its future state of aff airs. Th at resembles the idea presented by Brown: 
from the individual perspective, a system may seem to behave largely un-
predictably, but once we take a system-wide perspective, we can spot certain 
regularities.100
An insistence on complexity of social can be found also in critical real-
ism.101 However, it comes to this conclusion by using an old-fashioned ontol-
ogy that sticks to the hierarchical image of universe and radically diff erent 
ontological layers. It cannot bring together fossil fuel resources, typhoons, 
politics and economic behaviour of consumers. Perhaps, it seems to be 
a marginal problem, but when we come to the question to what extent some 
events are strictly regular, we cannot accept critical realism, for it exorcise 
a cornerstone of our understanding of global ecosystem, in which economic 
activity occurs and which is thus necessary for our comprehension of the 
nature of economy as such.
Now, to sum up the main theses of the paper, I argued that:
1. In ecological economics, one needs to presuppose the existence of strict 
causal regularities, which are otherwise rejected in the realm of socio-econo-
mical relationships by critical realism.
2. Th e notion of social actor is in critical realism too narrow to include some 
key economic actors – notably the material, non-human parts of the environ-
ment in which the economy is localised.
99  François DIAZ MAURIN – Zora KOVACIC, “Th e Unresolved Controversy over Nuclear 
Power: A  New Approach from Complexity Th eory.” Global Environmental Change, vol. 31,
2015, p. 211 (207–216).
100 BROWN, “Reorienting Critical Realism,” p. 508.
101  LAWSON, Reorienting Economics, p. 19.
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3. Ecological economics – contrary to critical realism – incorporates non-hu-
mans into very core of its pre-analytic intuition. Critical realism thus ontologi-
cally speaking resembles rather presuppositions of environmental economics as 
understood in Chapter 2, despite being methodologically dissonant.
Let me conclude with one fi nal remark. Th e insistence on material-
ity of economic processes is tremendously important once we see how it 
infl uences our notion of social norms and policies. Ecological economics 
inform us about the nature, and thus about limits of real-world economies 
as aggregates of specifi c social practices. Consequently, it imposes bounda-
ries upon real-world economies in terms of which economic activities can 
be sustainably realized, and hence they provide a  general framework for 
production and reproduction of social and political norms that guide our 
economic activities. Ecological economics is in this sense engaged into the 
process of generating certain politics (or regimes) of value102 and its purpose 
is to propose and criticise particular norms and normative systems from its 
distinct standpoint. Critical realism pleads for similar engagement of social 
sciences.103 But it does not purport suffi  cient groundings for its justifi cation.
102 Arjun APPADURAI, “Introduction: Commodities and the Politic s of Value.” In: 
APPADURAI, A. (ed.), Th e Social Life of Th ings: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, pp. 3–63.
103  See e.g. Andrew COLLIER, “Explanation and Emancipation.” In: ARCHER et al., Critical 
Realism: Essential Readings, pp. 444–472.
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